Wednesday, 3 October 2018

Magisterial Lapses : When Remand Requests Are Blindly Rubber Stamped


Two recent cases of glaring magisterial lapses deserve discussion.

The recent case of Lois Sofia is disturbing. Sofia, a 28 year old student, was remanded to 15 days judicial custody for raising anti-BJP slogans in the presence of TN BJP Chief Tamilisai Soundarajan, while de-boarding an aircraft. Her arrest and subsequent remand happened in the FIR registered on the basis of Soundarajan's complaint.

Last week, a Magistrate in Delhi authorised Maharashtra police to take Gautham Navlakha to Pune, even in absence of translated copies of FIR and case diary which were in Marathi. We have also seen instances in past where persons have been remanded to judicial custody for liking Facebook posts. These instances make one examine the constitutional function of Magistracy.

The fact that ’magistrate’ is the only judicial authority which finds explicit mention in Part III of the Constitution of India(apart from the reference to Supreme Court in Article 32) underlines its importance. As per Article 22(2), every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to court of the magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate.

The provisions in Code of Criminal Procedure reinforce the role of Magistrate by restating the Constitutional mandate through Sections 57 and 167. As per Section 167(1), detention of a person beyond the period of 24 hours can be sought for only if 'there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well-founded'.

The constitutional protection would become meaningless if the Magistrate was merely to act mechanically without applying  judicial mind to see whether the arrest of the person produced before him was in accordance with law. The power to remand during investigation is to be exercised 'judicially' with greatest care. While doing so, the Magistrate is not to act like a 'post office', mechanically forwarding the accused to the police custody by accepting the police version. This has been explained by the Supreme Court in Manubhai Ratilal Pater Tr.Ushaben vs. State of Gujarat (2013) 1 SCC 314 as :

"The act of directing remand of an accused is fundamentally a judicial function. The Magistrate does not act in executive capacity while ordering the detention of an accused. While exercising this judicial act, it is obligatory on the part of the Magistrate to satisfy himself whether the materials placed before him justify such a remand or, to put it differently, whether there exist reasonable grounds to commit the accused to custody and extend his remand..
This requires the investigating agency to send the case diary along with the remand report so that the Magistrate can appreciate the factual scenario and apply his mind whether there is a warrant for police remand or justification for judicial remand or there is no need for any remand at all. It is obligatory on the part of the Magistrate to apply his mind and not to pass an order of remand automatically or in a mechanical manner "(emphasis supplied)

However, there are cases where detention is authorised in a routine, casual and cavalier manner.  It may be noted that there is no obligation cast on the police to arrest a person as soon as he is named as accused in an FIR. Rather, law mandates that arrest should be made only when it is absolutely necessary. This position has been clarified as per amendment brought to Cr.P.C in 2009, which substantively changed Section 41. As per the amended Section 41, arrest for offences which are punishable with imprisonment up to seven years can be made only in exceptional circumstances.  According to Section 41(1)(b)(ii), CrPC, the police officer has to record satisfaction in writing that arrest in such cases is necessary :-
(a) to prevent such person from committing any further offence; or
(b) for proper investigation of the offence; or
(c) to prevent such person from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear or tampering with such evidence in any manner; or
(d) to prevent such person from making any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to the police officer; or
(e) as unless such person is arrested, his presence in the Court whenever required cannot be ensured.

While passing remand orders in such cases, where the maximum punishment for the offence in the FIR is imprisonment up to seven years, the Magistrate has to be extra-cautious in ensuring that conditions under Section 41(b) are fulfilled. This has been explained by the Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar AIR 2014 SC 2756 :
"If the arrest effected by the Police Officer does not satisfy the requirements of S.41 of the Code, Magistrate is duty bound not to authorise his further detention and release the accused. In other words, when an accused is produced before the Magistrate, the Police Officer effecting the arrest is required to furnish to the Magistrate, the facts, reasons and its conclusions for arrest and the Magistrate in turn is to be satisfied that condition precedent for arrest under S.41 CrPC has been satisfied and it is only thereafter that he will authorise the detention of an accused. The Magistrate before authorising detention will record its own satisfaction, may be in brief but the said satisfaction must reflect from its order.
It shall never be based upon the ipse dixit of the Police Officer, for example, in case the Police Officer considers the arrest necessary to prevent such person from committing any further offence or for proper investigation of the case or for preventing an accused from tampering with evidence or making inducement etc., the Police Officer shall furnish to the Magistrate the facts, the reasons and materials on the basis of which the Police Officer had reached its conclusion. Those shall be perused by the Magistrate while authorising the detention and only after recording its satisfaction in writing that the Magistrate will authorise the detention of the accused. In fine, when a suspect is arrested and produced before a Magistrate for authorising detention, the Magistrate has to address the question whether specific reasons have been recorded for arrest and if so, prima facie those reasons are relevant and secondly a reasonable conclusion could at all be reached by the Police Officer that one or the other conditions stated above are attracted. To this limited extent the Magistrate will make judicial scrutiny" (emphasis supplied).

The import of the said provisions is that normally where an accused has been named in the FIR, and the offence is punishable with upto 7 years imprisonment, the arrest of the accused may not be necessary at the initial stage and his attendance may be secured by issuing a notice to him to appear before the police officer under S.41A CrPC. In such cases it would be advisable to arrest the accused only after sufficient evidence of his involvement in the crime has been collected and the charge sheet needs to be submitted.

Coming back to the case of Sofia, as per reports, the offences punishable under IPC Sections 505 (statements conducing to public mischief), 290 (public nuisance) and Section 75 of the Tamil Nadu City Police Act are included in the FIR against her. The maximum punishment for the offences alleged against her is imprisonment up to 3 years, under Section 505 IPC ( assuming that the provision is attracted to a case of raising a slogan against ruling party). Therefore, the police had to give special reasons for justifying her straight-away arrest.

It was also incumbent on the part of the Magistrate to explain why her custody is inevitable for the investigation of the case relating to raising slogans. Failure to do so would be abdication of judicial responsibilities. When the seemingly secessionist slogan "Khalistan Zinadabad" has been held not be be offensive by the Supreme Court(Balwant Singh v State of Punjab AIR 1995 SC 1785), it is incomprehensible how anti-government slogans can constitute any punishable offence.

The transit remand order in the Bhima-Koregaon arrest also raised certain troubling questions. The Delhi High Court had doubted the validity of remand order issued by Chief Metrapolitan Magistrate, Saket granting custody of Gautham Navlakha to Maharashtra Police for transit to Pune. The High Court noted that the FIR and case diary were prepared in Marathi, and the translated copies of the same were not made available to Magistrate. The bench of Justice Muralidhar and Justice Vinod Goel wondered how the magistrate granted transit remand without perusing the arrest documents in the language (Marathi) of a different state, and expressed that the CMM should have been extra careful applied judicial mind before ordering remand. It was also contended in the case that that the witnesses of the arrest memo were persons who were brought by Maharashtra Police from Maharashtra, and that no local persons witnessed the arrest. This is in violation of the guidelines of the Supreme Court D.K Basu case, which were later incorporated in Cr.P.C in Sections 41B(b)(i).  These glaring violations escaped notice of the CMM while granting transit remand.

The Magistracy has a solemn function to perform in the protection of personal liberties. They are the ‘first line of defence’ against assaults on citizens through arbitrary police actions. It was held by Allahabad High Court way back in 1959 that the Magistrate is not simply to 'rubber stamp' the prayer of the police officer seeking remand of the accused(Bir Bhadra Pratap Singh v D M Azamgarh AIR 1959 All 384). It may not be within the capabilities of everyone to approach higher constitutional courts against arbitrary and illegal arrests. Each moment of illegal detention adds indelible scars on the detenu's mind. Therefore, it is important for the Magistrates to be conscious of their larger constitutional role to check state excesses against personal liberties.
(Update : Sofia was released on bail, unconditionally,)

Published in Live Law on September 4.  

Oscar Wilde's Moment Of Redemption By SC In Sec.377 Judgment

The literary genius was labelled a ‘sex pervert’ by a 1976 SC judgment.

Oscar Wilde, famous English writer and champion of individualism, was unfortunately branded a ‘sex pervert’ by the Supreme Court in a 1976 judgment. It was the judgment in R K Agarwal v State of Orissa AIR 1976 SC 1774, where the Supreme Court was dealing with an appeal filed by a 70 year old man convicted under Section 376 IPC for rape of a 6 year old girl. While rejecting his prayer for reduction of sentence in consideration of his advanced age, the Court, speaking through Justice  V R Krishna Iyer, observed that jail term in his old age could kindle in him a new flame of search for the truth and make him a finer person.  As an example that prison term could bring in reformation, it was stated “No one is too old to become good and 'De Profundis' was written in prison by a sex pervert who was also a literary genius”.

The literary genius referred here is Oscar Wilde, who wrote “De Profundis” while serving prison term after conviction under the charge of “gross indecency with other men”. During the prime of his literary success in London, Wilde had a homosexual affair with Lord Alfred Douglas, which became a public scandal. Wilde was prosecuted for his homosexual affection under the Offences Against Persons Act 1861 for 'sodomy' and 'gross indecency'. During the trial, Wilde defended his homosexual relationship, with impassioned arguments on individual autonomy and sexual agency. He had written a poem “Two Loves” with the verse, “Love that dare not speak its name”, about his love for Lord Douglas.  The poem was cited as an evidence of his “indecency”’. The following extract from the trial is worth reading.

Charles Gill (prosecutor): What is "the love that dare not speak its name?
Wilde: "The love that dare not speak its name" in this century is such a great affection of an elder for a younger man as there was between David and Jonathan, such as Plato made the very basis of his philosophy, and such as you find in the sonnets of Michelangelo and Shakespeare. It is that deep spiritual affection that is as pure as it is perfect. It dictates and pervades great works of art, like those of Shakespeare and Michelangelo, and those two letters of mine, such as they are. It is in this century misunderstood, so much misunderstood that it may be described as "the love that dare not speak its name," and on that account of it I am placed where I am now. It is beautiful, it is fine, it is the noblest form of affection. There is nothing unnatural about it. It is intellectual, and it repeatedly exists between an older and a younger man, when the older man has intellect, and the younger man has all the joy, hope and glamour of life before him. That it should be so, the world does not understand. The world mocks at it, and sometimes puts one in the pillory for it.

But his exhortations were not received well by the Court and the society, which were bogged down by prudish notions of Victorian morality.  He was sentenced for two years of imprisonment with hard labour in 1895. While serving his prison term, Wilde wrote “De Profoundis”, a poignant work on the sufferings of life, with deep spiritual undertones. “To regret one’s own experiences is to arrest one’s own development. To deny one’s own experiences is to put a lie into the lips of one’s own life. It is no less than a denial of the soul.”, he said in the work. Prison crushed his mind and body, and he died at the age of 46, impoverished and broken.

A man with such profound thoughts was unfortunately bracketed with a child-rapist by the Supreme Court in R.K Agarwal. To his credit, Justice Krishna Iyer has quoted Wilde positively in a later judgment. In Maru Ram vs. Union of India AIR 1980 SC 2147, while determining the term of sentence of life imprisonment in the backdrop of Section 433A CrPC, Justice Iyer quoted Oscar Wilde from the poem The Ballad of Reading Gaol, to highlight the despair caused to prisoners by uncertainty about the length of their term. The statement in R. K Agarwal could have been an inadvertence; however, it became a judicial stamping of Oscar Wilde as a “sex pervert”.

The thoughts expressed by Oscar Wilde on bodily autonomy and sexual agency found resonance with the Supreme Court in Navtej Johar while scrapping Section 377 IPC to the extent it applied to consenting adults. The judgements of Justice Nariman and Justice Chandrachud quoted Wilde extensively.

Justice Nariman starts his judgment by stating : “The love that dare not speak its name” is how the love that exists between same-sex couples was described by Lord Alfred Douglas, the lover of Oscar Wilde, in his poem Two Loves published in 1894 in Victorian England. Justice Nariman also details the trial of Oscar Wilde, and notes that this case led to led to law reform in the U.K to decriminalize homosexuality, 60 years later.  The statement made by Oscar Wilde in the trial, in response to prosecutor’s query about his poem, has been quoted in its entirety by Justice Nariman.

Justice Chandrachud too makes a mention of “the love that dare not speak its name”, in his judgment. He cites Oscar Wilde as one of several eminent persons, who had to face prosecution for homosexuality. Justice Chandrachud’s observation in the judgment that “Sexuality must be construed as a fundamental experience through which individuals define the meaning of their lives”, echoed the thoughts expressed by Wilde through his life and writings.

Justice Indu Malhotra’s statement that history owes an apology to the members of homosexual community for the ignominy and ostracism caused to them by law, can be taken as an apology to Oscar Wilde as well, for the unfortunate label put on him by the Court four decades ago.

So, in one sense,Navtej Singh Johar redeems Oscar Wilde.

Post Script : The UK passed a law in 2013, granting posthumous pardon to about 50,000 gay men who were convicted and sentenced for homosexuality, including Oscar Wilde.

Published in Live Law on September 7

Tuesday, 25 September 2018

Celebration Of Sexual Agency : Justice Chandrachud's Soulful Judgment In Section 377 Case



"Sexuality must be construed as a fundamental experience through which individuals define the meaning of their lives"

Deeply moving and empathetic, Justice Chandrachud's judgment in the Section 377 case makes for a compelling read. Rather than legalese, the judgment is brimming with a profound understanding of the human condition and of the urge of an individual to find meaning through self-expression by staying true to one’s core identity.

The judgment deconstructs Section 377 in a larger perspective, to conclude that it is not merely stifling expression of sexuality which is in variance with the dominant “hetronormative” narrative, but is advancing sexual stereotypes and cementing traditionally assigned gender roles. On this premise, Section 377 is held as causing discrimination on the ground of ‘sex’, so as to infringe Article 15(1) of the Constitution. While doing so, the judgment in Nargesh Meerza which took a narrow view of sex-based discrimination was overruled. Moving further, the judgment holds that Section 377 IPC infringes ones’ right to intimacy, which has been held to be a facet of right to privacy under Article 21, observing that “consensual sexual relationships between adults, based on the human propensity to experience desire, must be treated with respect”

The judgment recognizes the need to remedy the “tragedy and anguish” inflicted by the Section. The history of the section is traced to identify its roots in Judeo-Christian notions of morality, which found reflection through a colonial legislation. The judgment draws power from the exhortations of Dr.Martin Luther King against the ‘doctrine of wait’, which advocates that non-conformists should wait till the mainstream understands their way of life, before disturbing established social mores. The sexual minorities have waited long, but nothing changed.

Unreasonable classification based on ‘Order of Nature’.

The section was held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, as it is based on unreasonable classification. The 2013 SC judgment in Suresh Kumar Koushal had held that there was no unreasonable classification, as “those who indulge in carnal intercourse in the ordinary course and those who ... [do so] against the order of nature constitute different classes”. This view was criticised as a formalistic application of Constitution. Justice Chandrachud identified the base of classification in Section 377 as “order of nature”, an indeterminable factor. “What is ‘natural’ and what is ‘unnatural’? And who decides the categorization into these two ostensibly distinct and water-tight compartments? Do we allow the state to draw the boundaries between permissible and impermissible intimacies between consenting adults?”, the judgment asked (Para 28, Page 294).

Developing from that premise, it was held that there was logical fallacy in ascribing legality to perceived natural acts on the basis of majority practise. As human being evolved, there has been a shift from reproductive instinct to erotic instinct, which may not be strictly ‘natural’.  And all that is not natural, need not be illegal. The judgment quotes an interesting observation from Brandon Ambrosino that, “Many of the things human beings value, such as medicine and art, are egregiously unnatural. At the same time, humans detest many things that actually are eminently natural, like disease and death”(Page 296).

 “Section 377 is based on a moral notion that intercourse which is lustful is to be frowned upon.It does so, on the basis of a social hypocrisy which the law embraces as its own. It would have human beings accept a way of life in which sexual contact without procreation is an aberration and worse still, penal. It would ask of a section of our citizens that while love, they may, the physical manifestation of their love is criminal. This is manifest arbitrariness writ large”, (Page 298)

Section 377 reveals only the hatred, revulsion and disgust of the draftsmen towards certain intimate choices of fellow human beings.”, held the judgment(Page 301).
Discrimination based on sexual orientation violates Article 15(1)

A significant finding of the judgment is that discrimination based on ‘sexual orientation’ amounts to sex-based discrimination, which is prohibited under Article 15(1). While reaching this conclusion, the judgment overturned the precedent Air India v.Nargesh Meerza (1981) 4 SCC 335. In the said case, service conditions prescribing different age of retirement for air hostesses, and that pregnancy will attract termination etc. were not held to be discriminatory with respect to male colleagues on the ground that females and males in service of aircraft constituted different cadres, and hence were not comparable. It was held there that where persons of a particular class, in view of the “special attributes, qualities” are treated differently in ‘public interest’, such a classification would not be discriminatory

Justice Chandrachud criticised this view as missing to notice the latent stereotypical notions of the differences between men and women which are then used to justify the discrimination. Nargesh Meerza was held to be incorrect noting, “A discrimination will not survive constitutional scrutiny when it is grounded in and perpetuates stereotypes about a class constituted by the grounds prohibited in Article 15(1). If any ground of discrimination, whether direct or indirect is founded on a stereotypical understanding of the role of the sex, it would not be distinguishable from the discrimination which is prohibited by Article 15 on the grounds only of sex”(para 41, page 313).

This was applied in the present case by identifying the root premise operating behind Section 377 – to reinforce gender stereotypes. It was held that Section 377 was based on ‘heterosexism’ and ‘gender binary’.

“If individuals as well as society hold strong beliefs about gender roles – that men (to be characteristically reductive) are unemotional, socially dominant, breadwinners that are attracted to women and women are emotional, socially submissive, caretakers that are attracted to men – it is unlikely that such persons or society at large will accept that the idea that two men or two women could maintain a relationship. If such a denial is further grounded in a law, such as Article 377 the effect is to entrench the belief that homosexuality is an aberration that falls outside the ‘normal way of life.’” (para 44, page 319)
It was noted that a heterosexist society expects and requires men and women to engage in only opposite-sex sexual relationships. “One cannot simply separate discrimination based on sexual orientation and discrimination based on sex because discrimination based on sexual orientation inherently promulgates ideas about stereotypical notions of sex and gender roles” (para 46, page 321)
It was also held that statutes like Section 377 give people ammunition to say “this is what a man is” by giving them a law which says “this is what a man is not.” The existence of the provision nonetheless facilitates it by perpetuating homophobic attitudes and making it almost impossible for victims of abuse to access justice. Thus, the social effects of such a provision, even when it is enforced with zeal, is to sanction verbal harassment, familial fear, restricted access to public spaces and the lack of safe spaces.

Section 377 criminalises identities

A notable feature in the approach of Justice Chandrachud is that he did not dwell much on the argument that Section 377 impacts heterosexual couples as well, as regards their involvement in sexual acts which are non-penovaginal. He emphatically asserted that the impact of the section was on sexual minorities (Para 44, Page 315). Though the provision is ‘facially neutral’ the effect of the provision is to efface specific identities.
“While facially Section 377 only criminalizes certain “acts”, and not relationships, it alters the prism through which a member of the LGBTQ is viewed. Conduct and identity are conflated.The impact of criminalising non-conforming sexual relations is that individuals who fall outside the spectrum of heteronormative127 sexual identity are perceived as criminals”(Para 56, Page 334)

Fresh perspective on right to privacy of sexual minorities

The judgment brought in a fresh perspective to analyse the right to privacy of sexual minorities in the light of Puttaswamy judgment. While sexual orientation has been held as a facet of right to privacy, to push sexual minorities to their private spaces alone will amount to reinforcing the closet in which they are in. The judgment powerfully stated that the “closet has to be confronted”. Confronting the closet would entail “reclaiming markers of all desires, identities and acts which challenge it.” It would also entail ensuring that individuals belonging to sexual minorities, have the freedom to fully participate in public life, breaking the invisible barrier that heterosexuality imposes upon them. Constitution must recognise that the public assertion of identity founded in sexual orientation is crucial to the exercise of freedoms(para 60, page 337). It is imperative that the protection granted for consensual acts in private must also be available in situations where sexual minorities are vulnerable in public spaces on account of their sexuality and appearance.
“If one accepts the proposition that public places are heteronormative, and same-sex sexual acts partially closeted, relegating ‘homosexual‘ acts into the private sphere, would in effect reiterate the “ambient heterosexism of the public space.”  It must be acknowledged that members belonging to sexual minorities are often subjected to harassment in public spaces.The right to sexual privacy, founded on the right to autonomy of a free individual, must capture the right of persons of the community to navigate public places on their own terms, free from state interference” (para 62, page 339)

Celebration of sexual agency

The judgment is a “celebration of sexual agency” in the light of right to intimacy.  Right to intimacy, flowing from the right to privacy and individual autonomy, has not been so beautifully commented upon in any other judgment. The discussion on this, from Paragraph 67, page 344 onwards, is captivating and transcendental. Certain profound observations on the human longing for fulfilment of desire and companionship are extracted below :
“Consensual sexual relationships between adults, based on the human propensity to experience desire must be treated with respect. In addition to respect for relationships based on consent, it is important to foster a society where individuals find the ability for unhindered expression of the love that they experience towards their partner”.
“An individual’s sexuality cannot be put into boxes or compartmentalized; it should rather be viewed as fluid, granting the individual the freedom to ascertain her own desires and proclivities”.
“Accepting the role of human sexuality as an independent force in the development of personhood is an acknowledgement of the crucial role of sexual autonomy in the idea of a free individual. Such an interpretation of autonomy has implications for the widening application of human rights to sexuality”.
“Sexuality cannot be construed as something that the State has the prerogative to legitimize only in the form of rigid, marital procreational sex. Sexuality must be construed as a fundamental experience through which individuals define the meaning of their lives”.
“Human sexuality cannot be reduced to a binary formulation. Nor can it be defined narrowly in terms of its function as a means to procreation. To confine it to closed categories would result in denuding human liberty of its full content as a constitutional right”
“The Constitution protects the fluidities of sexual experience. It leaves it to consenting adults to find fulfilment in their relationships, in a diversity of cultures, among plural ways of life and in infinite shades of love and longing”.
The conclusions of the judgment can be summated as :
  • Section 377 of the Penal Code, in so far as it criminalises consensual sexual conduct between adults of the same sex, is unconstitutional;
  • Members of the LGBT community are entitled, as all other citizens, to the full range of constitutional rights including the liberties protected by the Constitution;
  • The choice of whom to partner, the ability to find fulfilment in sexual intimacies and the right not to be subjected to discriminatory behaviour are intrinsic to the constitutional protection of sexual orientation;
  • Members of the LGBT community are entitled to the benefit of an equal citizenship, without discrimination, and to the equal protection of law; and
  • The decision in Koushal stands overruled.
The judgment soulfully addresses certain existential puzzles of human condition – identity, autonomy, relationship with the collective, dynamics of desire etc. - through the constitutional framework. As much as with constitutional erudition, the judgment has been penned with a romantic and humane touch.

Published in Live Law on September 6

Saturday, 1 September 2018

A Journey Through Notable Judgments of The Newly Sworn-In SC Judges



Three new judges— Justice Indira Banerjee, Justice Vineet Saran and Justice KM Joseph were sworn in on Tuesday at 10:30 am in the Chief Justice’s Court, raising the total number of judges to 25, as against the sanctioned strength of 31 judges. A few of the notable judgments delivered by these judges during their tenure at High Court are presented below.

Justice Indira Banerjee.

Justice Banerjee enrolled as an Advocate in July, 1985, and practiced extensively on the Original and Appellate Sides of Calcutta High Court. She was appointed as a Permanent Judge of the High Court in February, 2002, and was transferred to Delhi High Court in August, 2016. She was, thereafter, elevated as the Chief Justice of Madras High Court, a post of which she took charge in April, 2017.
One notable judgment of Justice Banerjee in Calcutta High Court dealt with the issue of consent of woman for sexual intercourse. It was a case where a man was convicted of abducting and raping a woman. The accused had defended himself stating that he and the woman were in a relationship who had willingly came out with him, and that there was no resistance from her against sexual intercourse. The brother judge of Justice Banerjee in the bench, Justice Indrajit Chatterjee, acquitted the accused holding that he had consensual sex. The fact that the woman did not attempt to run away from his company, and the absence of external injury marks in her body persuaded Justice Chatterjee to hold so.

However, Justice Banerjee dissented from that view, and held that mere absence of physical injuries cannot be a ground to presume that sex was consensual. She held that even if it was assumed that the victim harboured the wish to marry the accused appellant for which she readily went to the house of the accused appellant, when he called her, it cannot be deduced that of her own free Will and volition, she consented to casual sex with the accused appellant, knowing that they might never get married

Explaining the nature of free consent for sex, Justice Banerjee succinctly held : "The consent should be spontaneous, stemming from the victim's own desire to sexually unite with the accused. A mere act of helpless resignation in the teeth of compulsion whether by reason of threat of physical violence, emotional blackmail, fear, coercion or duress cannot be consent, as understood in law. In this context it may be pertinent to note that there is a difference between submission and consent and mere non - resistance and / or passive giving in cannot be consent as understood in law. In my view, even emotional blackmail that might reasonably be perceived as a veiled threat to end an existing relationship by calling off an engagement or a marriage proposal would also vitiate the consent".(Laxmi Kantha Kamath v. State of West Bengal 2015 CriLJ 2220)

Her judgment in Srei Equipment and Finance Pvt Ltd v. Khyoda Apik and others AIR 2016 Cal 293 is noteworthy for the clinical analysis of different provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996. It was held that an arbitration award can be executed only by a court which could exercise jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act , and that Court cannot refuse to execute award on ground that assets of judgment debtor were located beyond its jurisdiction.

As the Chief Justice of Madras High Court, Justice Banerjee had to deal with several prominent and contentious issues like the disqualification of AIADMK MLAs by by the Speaker of Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly. There too Justice Banerjee delivered a dissenting opinion. While Justice Banerjee upheld the decision of the speaker to disqualify the MLAs, her brother judge Justice Sundar disagreed. As the Chief Justice, she referred the matter to be heard by the next senior judge. Her act of nominating the next senior judge to hear the matter, instead of naming any specific judge, was commended by many in the legal circles as an act of fairness and propriety.

Justice Banerjee delivered yet another dissenting judgment in the case concerning the validity of TRAI Regulations. In October 2017, she authored a  judgment, laying down detailed guidelines for recording of statements under Section 164 CrPC and conduct of test identification parade.

During her tenure, the Madras High Court witnessed the rarity of having an all-women bench. Shortly after her appointment as CJ, she sat in combination with Justice Bhavani Subbaroyan. Later, she  sat with Justice R. Hemalatha. Towards the end of her tenure in Madras High Court, she shared bench with recently appointed Justice P.T Asha. Presiding this bench, she authored the judgment holding that arrest of an accused from a court room is illegal, and punished the policemen who carried out such arrest for contempt of court.

Justice Vineet Saran.

Justice Vineet Saran enrolled as an Advocate with the U.P. Bar Council in July, 1980, and practiced in the Allahabad High Court till February, 2002, when he was elevated as a Permanent Judge of the High Court. He was transferred to Karnataka High Court in February, 2015, and was sworn in as the Chief Justice of Orissa High Court in February, 2016.

As a judge of Allahabad High Court, Justice Vineet Saran authored a judgment, while presiding a Division Bench, holding that the High Court can order CBI enquiry in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India even without consent of the State Govt if the investigation by State Police is demonstrably biased and incompetent(Ravi Kant Gupta v. State of UP 2011 CriLJ 4482). 

In Sandhya Goni v.State of Karnataka 2016 CriLJ NOC 30, as a presiding judge of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court, Justice Saran held that habeas corpus petition was maintainable at the instance of a mother, from whom custody of a child was illegally taken away by the father. Justice Saran was also part of the Bench which quashed the decision of the Governor of Karnataka to grant sanction to prosecute ex-CM B.S Yeddyurappa. It was held there that the decision of the Governor was not based on relevant materials(B.S Yeddyurappa v. Princpal Secretary to His Excellency Governor of Karnataka 2016 CriLJ 778).

As the Chief Justice of Orissa High Court, the Division Bench headed by Justice Saran held that the High Court can impose restrictions on news-reporting by print and electronic media to prevent interference with criminal trial. The matter pertained to media reporting an alleged incident involving with some advocates misbehaving with a lady inspector.  There, directions were issued to restrain media from publishing the name and photographs of the accused persons and informants, on the basis of finding that exaggerated reporting of the incident tend to interfere with administration of justice (High Court Bar Association, Odisha v. State of Odisha AIR 2017 Ori.62)

The legalistic fervour of Justice Saran is manifest from the judgment Mohapatra Binders and others v. Innprint and others AIR 2017 NOC 2015 which held that precedents which were not based on legal principles but misplaced sympathy cannot be regarded as binding. In Manuel Antonio Da Anunciaco Parkasch v. Republic of India, AIR 2017 NOC 444, Justice Saran held that a foreigner cannot complaint of infringement of fundamental rights due to denial of citizenship.

In Silicon Institute of Technology v.State of Odisha AIR 2017 Ori.151, the bench of Justice Saran interfered with admission process of self-financing institutions, and held that self-financing institutions picking up students of their choice from the merit list was illegal.

Justice K M Joseph

Justice K M Joseph carries the rich legacy of his illustrious father Justice K.K Mathew. Justice Joseph enrolled as an Advocate in January, 1982, and was appointed as a Permanent Judge of the Kerala High Court in October, 2004. He was then transferred to the Uttarakhand High Court and assumed charge as the Chief Justice in July, 2014.

The most debated judgment of Justice Joseph is the one which quashed the imposition of presidential rule in Uttarakhand in 2016. The judgment - delivered on sharing bench with Justice V.K Bist-  held that it was not open for the Governor to control the exercise of discretion vested with another constitutional authority, the Speaker. The imposition of presidential rule was termed "unwarranted". The judgment was rendered despite noting the allegations of corruption against the then incumbent CM Harish Rawat. It was held that the issue had to be addressed at a more fundamental level of federalism and constitutional democracy.

As a judge of Kerala High Court, the bench presided by Justice Joseph ordered the demolition of several resorts built encroaching the backwaters of Kerala, in Ratheesh K R v State of Kerala. The constructions were found to have flouted CRZ Regulations. The judgment expressed anguish and concern at the alarming rate of environmental depradation, which was described as “ecocide”.

“The threat of global warming has assumed alarming proportions. In matters relating to the protection of the environment, a short sighted and myopic approach, may satisfy some and may be many in the short run. But, the Court when it enforces laws in protection of the environment becomes the custodian of the interests of not only the present generation, but also of posterity. While it is convenient and even may sound as just to overlook the mandate of a cumbersome or seemingly oppressive law, both the law giver and the Courts have to enforce the law and cannot but act with vision. Prompt and effective enforcement of such laws will in due course result in the inculcation of the values embedded in the law as habits which will be followed by the future generations”,Justice Joseph observed in the judgment.

In Alexander CC v. Jacob Antony , the bench headed by him held that illegitimacy was no bar for a minor child to claim maintenance from biological father,as the claim was based on paternity and not legitimacy. It was also held that Family Court has jurisdiction determine the issue of paternity.

In Pavithran v. District Superintendent of Police, Justice Joseph, as a single judge, ruled that loudspeakers cannot be used beyond midnight, even for religious and cultural functions.

Justice Joseph is known to have a penchant for constitutional law and jurisprudence. He has a special eye for details, and perceives legal issues in his own unique manner.  Legal principles, which are not commonly known and used, are often invoked in his judgements.  In once case, he expounded the obscure principle of "Desuetude", which states that law, which has not been in use for a considerable long time, is deemed to have been repealed by consistent usage to the contrary( Davis B.O v. B.T Martin and another, Kerala HC)

A direction issued by Justice K.M Joseph regarding prison reforms had earned him encomiums from veteran Justice V. R Krishna Iyer.  Justice V.R Krishna Iyer wrote him a letter, congratulating him.  The letter, which has been accessed by Live Law, reads as follows
"My dear Justice K. M Joseph,
I respect you for many reasons beyond being the sublime son of my dearest brother Justice Mathew. I was once a minister in charge of prisons meant to implement the fundamental duty of compassion towards all living creatures I had reformed the prisons of Kerala from its British barbarity to humane divinity. Today, a friend of mine pointed out that the philistinic barbarity still lurks in our prison and a prisoner was badly beaten in Aleppey Sub Jail. And you a humane justice with compassion ordered an enquiry compelled in your soul by a sense of love and kindness.
Your are truly a great Chairman of Kerala Legal Services Authority. The rule of law serves its purpose only when it ennobles life in all its dimensions.
I congratulate you on the order you have passed and hope the Legal Services under your supervision will make humanism and justice in Kerala prisons undergo a transformation. The newspaper report about your direction also mentions about the inhumanity in the jail where people who are prisoners freely smoke which will cause cancer mortality. In a room of 14, says the Mathrubhumi report, there are 40, which in itself is a condemnation of suffocation and suffering. O, the pity of it!'
With warm regards,
Yours sincerely
V.R Krishna Iyer".

The Live Law team wishes Justice Indira Banerjee, Justice Vineet Saran and Justice K.M Joseph all the best in their judgeship at Supreme Court

[Published in Live Law on August 8]

Friday, 17 August 2018

Independence Day Special : Is Independent India A Creation Of British Parliament?



Independence of India was not a mere transfer of power; it was the birth of a new nation, with  renewed identity and fresh set of aspirations. It was the result of long struggle by the people of India. The freedom struggle was not just a political mobilization; rather, it was a cultural movement which shaped the national identity.

The abstract notion of independence was given concrete contours through the legislative medium of "Indian Independence Act,1947". Enacted by the British Parliament, the Indian Independence Act dealt with the modalities of transfer of power and transitory provisions. The end of colonial domain and the division of British India into two domains- India and Pakistan- were implemented through this Act.
The preamble of the Act read :- "An Act to make provision for the setting up in India of two independent Dominions, to substitute other provisions for certain provisions of the Government of India Act, 1947". Fifteenth August 1947 was the "appointed day" as per the Act. As per Section 1 of the Act, two independent dominions, respectively known as India and Paksitan, will come into existence from the appointed day (But the transfer of power for Pakistan was ceremonially held on August 14, 1947, because Lord Mountbatten wanted to attend both the functions of India and Pakistan).  The Act provided for mechanism for division of Bengal and Punjab provinces between both nations. It established the office of Governor General to represent the British Crown in the new dominions, until the adoption of Constitution.

Colonial rule was put to end by Section 7, which stated that from the appointed day, the British Crown will have no responsibility in the aspects of governance of areas which were part of British India.  It also stated that the suzerainty of British Crown over Indian States lapsed with effect from the appointed day. The States were given liberty to opt out of the common wealth.

Legislative Autonomy & Constituent Assembly
Section 6 of the Act granted legislative autonomy to the new dominions. It stated that laws passed by the UK Parliament after the appointed day will not apply to the dominions. It also stated that new legislations passed by the dominions need not get the assent of the Crown, and that they will not be void due to any repugnancy with laws passed by the UK Parliament.
Section 8 conferred power on the Constituent Assembly to prepare a Constitution for the new dominions. The Constituent Assembly was established as per Cabinet Mission plan of 1946, and its members were elected in the provincial elections held in 1946.  It was given legal recognition by Section 8 of the Indian Independence Act. This Section also dealt with transitory powers, by stating that till the enactment of Constitution, the dominions will be governed as nearly as possible in accordance with the Government of India Act 1935.

Is Independent India a Creation of British Parliament?

If the end of colonial rule and independence of India was made possible through this enactment, one doubt will arise- Is Independent India a creation of British Parliament?.
It is not acceptable that Indian Independence is solely founded on an Act passed by the British Parliament. Reducing Indian independence to a mere legislative grant by the imperial ruler will impinge on the pride and autonomy of Indian people, who won freedom through years of fight and struggle.
Certainly this was a legislative anomaly, which had to be corrected. What would have been the outcome if the UK Parliament repealed the Indian Independence Act with retrospective effect?

The Constituent Assembly applied their mind on this aspect. To assert independence and autonomy of India, it was necessary to sever all sorts of legislative ties which linked it with the imperial ruler. This was done by repealing the Indian Independence Act, 1947 as per Article 395 of the Constitution of India. Here, one may wonder- whether the Constituent Assembly, which was a creation of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, could have repealed the Act, which was its parent in a sense.

This is where the independent existence of Constitution of India gets clear. The repeal of the Indian Independence Act was done by the Constitution of India, and not the Constituent Assembly, because the Constitution assumed its own  autonomous existence, independent of its creators, upon coming into being. The Constitution came into existence by automatically extinguishing its creator, the Constituent Assembly, which was disbanded on January 24, 1950. This is symbolic of the independent existence of Constitution, without any pre-existing ties to any external entity. This is where the words "We, the people  of India,..... hereby enact, adopt and give to ourselves this Constitution" resound with meaning. The Constitution was not given to the people of India by the UK Parliament or the Constituent Assembly. It was given to the people of India by themselves.  Thus, "the people of India", became the source of the Constitution of India, and its Kalsenian ground norm.

In doing so, the Constituent Assembly had taken cue from Ireland. Irish Independence was granted as per Irish Free State Constitution Act, 1922 enacted by the UK Parliament. Irish Constitution was enacted by the Constituent Assembly created by this Act. In order to cut the umbilical cord with the previous ruler, the Irish Constitution abolished the Irish Free State Constitution Act, 1922.
Jurisprudentially, this practise is called "Constitutional Autochtony", which refers to deliberate Constitutional measures adopted by newly independent States to place the root of their autonomy in their indigenous soil, by breaking the chain of legal continuity from erstwhile rulers.  This concept has been well explained by Dr.Shivprasad Swaminathan(Associate Professor, Jindal Global Law School), in his article "India's benign constitutional revolution", published in "The Hindu" in 2013. He explains that "the goal of constitutional autochthony is to deliver an indigenous Constitution, the source of whose ‘authority’ can be located in the new state’s own soil". Dr. Swaminathan states that the quest for autochthony symbolically ensures that the independent future will be insulated from a troubled imperial past.

This ingenious measure ensured that the roots of Indian independence will not be located in an imperial legislation, but within the hopes and aspirations of people of India, as it rightly should be.

Published in Live Law on August 15, 2018

Somnath Chatterjee : A Man Who Held Constitution of India Always Supreme

"Rule of law has to be enforced not by expanding any organ's extent of powers, by encroaching into areas specifically assigned to any other, but by diligently and effectively discharging each one's assigned responsibilities."- Somnath Chatterjee, commenting on judicial interference in legislative domain.


Somnath Chatterjee must have despised an unidimensional life. Perhaps, that's the reason why he chose to wear multiple hats to perform all ranges of roles which legal education enables one to do - lawyer, legislator, politician, author, jurist and parliamentarian.
He was also someone who defied predictable patterns in life. Though his father Nirmal Chandra Chatterjee- a prominent lawyer who went on to become a judge of Calcutta High Court - was one of the founding members of Hindu Mahasabha, Somnath Chatterjee drifted towards its ideological rival, the Left, and became a member of the Communist Party.  Later, he defied the diktat of his own Party, when his role as a Speaker and as a party member came in conflict, inviting expulsion from the party.

He had an illustrious career at law, and was designated as a Senior Advocate. But his deference for judiciary did not restrain him from openly calling foul, when he felt that Supreme Court was crossing the line by reviewing the decisions of Speaker and issuing directions for conduct of legislative proceedings. He launched a fiery battle to defend the Parliamentary privileges guaranteed by the Constitution, for he sternly believed that the Constitution was supreme, and  that all organs of the State have to perform only within their demarcated territories, strictly following the constitutional scheme.

Somnath Chatterjee was unanimously elected as the Speaker of Lok Sabha in 2004, when the coalition government under UPA came to power. His scholarship in Constitutional law and his outstanding track record as a Parliamentarian earned him the post.  As Speaker, he was very particular about preserving Parliamentary supremacy in the domain reserved to it by the Constitution, and loathed any sort of interference, even from the judiciary.

When the Supreme Court ordered the advancement of floor test of Jharkhand Legilsative Assembly in 2005 as per decision in Anil Kumar Jha v Union of India AIR 2005 SC 4255 (in a situation somewhat similar to the recent Karnataka Assembly case), Chatterjee was disappointed. He openly criticised the Supreme Court judgment, overlooking political considerations.

"It was a wrong decision. With due respect for the judiciary, which I fully respect, I say the Supreme Court should not have given this decision.  It was not judiciary’s work.  Whatever happened in Jharkhand assembly on the day decided by Supreme Court for vote of confidence was there for all to see. What would have the Court done after that? Could it have jailed the pro-tem speaker and the MLAs? Could it have sent police inside the assembly?", he said about the decision.

He even sought a presidential reference on the issue whether SC could order the conduct of proceedings of assembly in a particular manner. However, the ruling executive did not pursue the matter further, having regard to political ramifications. But, Chatterjee was unrelenting, and he convened a meeting of Speakers of all Assemblies, to discuss the issue. "I am the speaker of the Lok Sabha, the House of people’s representatives of the world’s largest democracy, I cannot silently see any interference in the functioning of legislature, if I remain silent, then I would be failing in my duty"- this was his firm conviction.

Late in 2005, another crises emerged, when  a sting operation caught several MPs demanding bribe for asking questions in Lok Sabha. Somnath Chatterjee, as the Speaker, issued order expelling 10 Lok Sabha MPs caught in the "cash for query scam". The expelled MPs approached the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court issued notice to the Speaker on their petition. This was strongly objected to by Chatterjee. He stated that the decision of the Speaker cannot be questioned by the Court, and that the Court had no authority to issue notice to the Speaker. He relied on Article 122 of the Constitution of India, which stated "1) The validity of any proceedings in Parliament shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure," and that "(2) No officer or member of Parliament in whom powers are vested by or under this Constitution for regulating procedure or the conduct of business, or for maintaining order, in Parliament shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any court in respect of the exercise by him of those powers."

Another show-down with the judiciary loomed large, when he declared that he will not respond to the notice of SC.  "As Speaker of Lok Sabha, I used my discretion because the matter concerns the House and is of utmost importance. Noting could have justified corruption. I think the issue is outside the purview of the judiciary since Parliament has right to decide such cases on its own", he said.
"Rule of law has to be enforced not by expanding any organ's extent of powers, by encroaching into areas specifically assigned to any other, but by diligently and effectively discharging each one's assigned responsibilities.

In the interests of harmonious functioning, I believe that no one organ of the State should usurp the functions which essentially belong to another, nor should it abdicate its essential functions and thereby upset the well-cherished principles of separation of powers and checks and balances provided by our Constitution", he added.

From his words, it is clear that he could not tolerate any deviation from the Constitutional scheme, whatever be the expediency. His decision to expel the MPs was upheld by a Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Raja Ram Pal v Speaker, Lok Sabha (2007) 3 SCC 184. In the decision, it is specifically noted that the Speaker did not appear in response to the notice. The expulsion was defended by the Union of India. Though the Court accepted the primacy of Parliamentary privileges, it held that judicial review of Speaker's decision is possible in exceptional circumstances. "Proceedings (of Parliament) which may be tainted on account of substantive or gross illegality or unconstitutionality are not protected from judicial scrutiny", held the bench.

Chatterjee was not happy with this conclusion made by the Supreme Court. He felt that the Court was rewriting Constitution under the guise of exercising judicial review.

He had to undergo another test of character in 2008, when CPI(M), then an ally of UPA, withdrew support to the government and moved an no-confidence motion over disagreement with India-US Nuclear Pact. The party leadership wanted Somnath Chatterjee to resign from the Speaker-post. However, Chatterjee refused to do so. He was of the strong belief that Speaker was above political considerations, as it was a Constitutional post. Therefore, he said that as an incumbent of a Constitutional post, he cannot obey party commands. Such a stand was unprecedented, as no Speaker ever in the history of Indian politics has hidden his political loyalties.
Commenting on the situation, the Telegraph wrote :- "Mr Chatterjee should do his duty, not his duty by his party, but his duty as a holder of an important constitutional office. Mr Chatterjee has been an extraordinarily successful speaker and before that he has been an eminent parliamentarian and lawyer, he needs nobody to tell him the importance of the Constitution. If he resigns as speaker he will set a very bad precedent; if he refuses to resign he will be remembered as a speaker who stood firm by the Constitution. The choice is between being a party loyalist and being a public figure. The fact that Mr Chatterjee did not immediately accede to Mr Karat’s request to resign is a positive sign. Mr Chatterjee holds in his hands a crucial issue of Indian democracy. It might by far be the best thing he ever did if he does not resign".

Such was the depth of character of Chatterjee that he could rise above his party loyalty, to uphold his allegiance to the Constitution. But that cost him his party membership. "It was the saddest day of my life", he said about the day when he was expelled from party for his refusal to resign from the post of Speaker.

In the matter of Constitutional interpretation, Somnath Chatterjee must have been an originalist-puritan, who believed in the sanctity of the words of the Constitution, which should not be tinkered with to suit the expediency of the moment. He would have preferred to think that Constitutional text is strong enough to provide answers to all questions posed by the present, if one has the patience and foresight to look through it. He had his reservations about the basic structure doctrine, despite being a staunch opponent of emergency. He was of the opinion that judges are out of touch with the pulse of the society, and hence should not deliberate upon political issues.
Originalism may be a waning school of thought these days, as it is regarded as a bondage to the wisdom of past. Yet, one has to salute Somnath Chatterjee for his unwavering commitment to Constitution, over and above his personal interests.

The democratic and liberal spirit of Chatterjee is evident from an order passed by him as Speaker, deciding not to proceed against a press report which had published defamatory content against the Speaker and Parliament. He held that it would be beneath the dignity of the House to take further note of the motivated imputations in the article by proceeding against it.
He has expressed disappointment with the confrontational style of politics being practised in the new age, without any unified goal or purpose. "We may differ on ideology, but that does not mean we should be at loggerheads.", he commented.

With his demise, we have lost a true democrat whose prime loyalty was towards constitutional morality.

Published in Live Law on August 14, 2018

Law As Tool For Social Change : Examples From Karunanidhi


The legislative changes piloted by him are notable, as they are illustrative of the power of law to act as a catalyst for social change.



Five-times CM and president of Dravida Munnetra Kazhakam(DMK) Party Muthuvel Karunanidhi, who passed away on August 7, rode to power on the wave of Dravidian movement. The Dravidian movement powered by the thoughts of Periyar E.V Ramaswamy started off as an attempt to assert Tamil cultural identity; gradually it gained more ideological depth under the guidance of Periyar, to become a radical-reformist movement based on rationalism, atheism, equality and social justice. Periyar’s clarion call for the destruction of upper caste hegemony, and restoration of equal status of backward castes, triggered off the ‘self-respect movement’. Periyar carried out the translation of Dr.Ambedkar’s work “Annihilation of Caste” in Tamil and cited Ambedkar in several of his writings and speeches.  Dravidian politics helmed by C.N. Annadurai and later by his protégé Karunanidhi drew from the well of thoughts of Periyar.

The astute administrator in Karunanidhi realized the power of law to  advance reform. Certain legislative moves made during his tenure demonstrate how law can be used as an instrument of social change, as propounded by the sociological school of jurisprudence.   Despite criticism about his brand of politics, at least during the later phase, his legislative changes are worthy of discussion.

Immediately after DMK got to power for the first time in 1967 under the leadership of C.N.Annadurai, they put into action their intentions to disrupt the social status-quo to further Dravidian ideology. Karunanidhi was a minister in the cabinet of Annadurai. First thing Annadurai did – change of name of the State as Tamil Nadu from Madras by enacting The Madras(Alteration of Name Act) 1968 – was symbolic of asserting Tamil sub-nationalism by cutting off ties with the colonial past. A more significant change during Annadurai’s tenure was the amendment of Hindu Marriage Act 1956, as per the Hindu Marriage(Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act 1967. By this amendment, Tamil Nadu became the first state to legalize “self-respect” marriages conducted without a Brahmin priest. The amendment introduced Section 7A in the principal Act, permitting “suyamariyathai”(self-respect) and “seerthiruttha”(reformist) marriages as legal when solemnised in the presence of friends, relatives or any other person by exchanging garlands or rings or by tying of mangalsutra or by a declaration in language understood by both the parties that they accept each other to be their spouses. This was putting the “self-respect movement” of Periyar into legislative action.

When Annadurai died in 1969, Karunanidhi became the CM, and carried forward the vision of his ideological mentors.

Changing hereditary appointment of ‘Archakas’ in Temples.

A revolutionary move by Karunanidhi after he became CM was bringing in legislation to change the rule of hereditary appointment of ‘archakas’ in temples, which had kept away several castes from doing priestly functions in temples. This was done by way of Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments (Amendment) Act 1970. Section 55 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments 1955 had given recognition to the hereditary appointment of archakas, by stating that “in cases where the office or service is hereditary, the person next in line of succession shall be entitled to succeed”

The 1970 Amendment introduced by Karunanidhi government changed this rule, by adding sub-section(2) to Section 55 stating “No person shall be entitled to appointment to any vacancy merely on the ground that he is next in the line of succession to the last holder of office”. As the objective of the Amendment, it was stated that the hereditary principle of appointment of office holders in the temples should be abolished and that the office on an archaka should be thrown open to all candidates trained in recognised institutions in priesthood irrespective of caste, creed or race

A group of hereditary archakas and mathadhipathis approached the Supreme Court challenging this amendment as infringing their right to freedom of religious belief under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. This was considered by a Constitution Bench, resulting in the landmark decision Seshammal v.State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1972 SC 1856, which explains the scope of state interference in religious affairs under Articles 25 and 26 so as to provide for social reform.

The Court repelled the challenge against the constitutional validity of the Amendment.  It was held that appointment of archaka was a secular function, upon which the State can interfere as per Article 26 of the Constitution. Hence, the Amendment was upheld as not interfering with any religious function or practise protected by Article 25. At the same time, the Court held that in a Saivite or a Vaishnavite temple the appointment of the archaka will have to be made from a specified denomination, sect or group in accordance with the directions of the Agamas governing those temples.

Giving equal coparcenary rights to Women
As per the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 enacted by the Parliament, daughters had no equal coparcenary rights in the ancestral property. They also had no right to seek for partition.

This discriminatory provision in the Central Act was amended, when Karunanidhi became CM during 1989. The Hindu Succession(Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act 1989 introduced Section 29A in the principal Act providing equal rights to daughters in coparcenary property. The newly introduced provision had a non-obstante clause, giving it overriding effect over Section 6 of the principal Act, which excluded daughters from coparcenary share. The Amendment also enabled daughters to seek partition of property. This amendment was in furtherance of Periyar’s thoughts on gender equality.

It took further 16 years for the Parliament to remove the discriminatory provisions, when it enacted the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act in 2005, by which provisions similar to the 1989 TN Amendment were included in the principal Act. Perhaps, Karunanidhi was someone who thought ahead of time.

Further changes in rule of appointment of ‘archakas’

After assuming power in 2006, the DMK government under Karunanidhi attempted to bring in further changes in the rule of appointment of temple archakas. Although the 1970 amendment had abolished the hereditary rule, several castes were still excluded from appointment of archakas due to prescriptions in agamas.

In 2002, the Supreme Court had held that the appointment of a non-Brahmin as a priest in a temple did not violate the religious rights of a Brahmin priest under Article 25 and 26(Adithyan v. Travancore Devaswom Board AIR 2002 SC 3538).

Taking a cue from his judgment, the DMK government issued a government order on May 23, 2006 stating, “Any person who is a Hindu and possessing the requisite qualification and training can be appointed as  Archaka in Hindu temples". The order made explicit reference to the SC decision in Adithyan.                          Also, an Ordinance(since lapsed) was brought in to further amend the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious Institutions Act to state that no custom or usage will stand in the way of appointing a qualified person as archaka.
The Explanatory statement to the Ordinance indicated the purpose behind further amendment of S.55(2) in the following terms.

"Archakas of the Temples are to be appointed without any discrimination of caste and creed. Custom or usage cannot be a hindrance to this. It is considered that the position is clarified in the Act itself and accordingly, it has been decided to amend S.55 of the said Act suitably”

This move was challenged in the Supreme Court, which was considered by a two judges Bench of Justice Ranjan Gogoi and Justice N.V Ramana. The Court did not invalidate the Government Order, stating that its validity can be determined only on a case to case basis. It was held that the exclusion of some and inclusion of a particular segment or denomination for appointment as archakas would not violate Art.14 so long such inclusion / exclusion is not based on the criteria of caste, birth or any other constitutionally unacceptable parameter. The Court also emphasised the importance of Agamas and held that appointment has to be in consonance with Agamas. It was held that so long as the injunctions in Agamas were not contrary to Constitutional parameters, they have to be deferred to.(Adi Saiva Sivachariyangal Nala Sangam v. State of T.N. AIR 2016 SC 209)

In 2008, Tamil Nadu became the first state to evolve a policy for rights of transgenders, when his government set up Tamil Nadu Transgender Welfare Board. This was years before the Supreme Court declared the rights of transgenders in NALSA judgment in 2014.
The political legacy left behind by Karunanidhi is debatable, and he is severely criticised for his seeming descent into opportunism in coalition politics and perpetuation of rule by dynasty. Nevertheless, the legislative changes piloted by him are notable, as they are illustrative of the power of law to act as a catalyst for social change.

Published in Live Law on August 9.